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on the true state of the world). Sharing perspectives,
then, improves information, which in turn might avoid
or mitigate belief polarization—especially in groups
that value conformity to neighboring members higher
than “information obtained from the world.” Based
on computer simulation, such groups are shown to de-
polarize, provided their learning dynamic registers a net
gain through trading perspectives.
Sebastian Schwark (Berlin) gave hands-on examples
of issues modern societies polarize over (e.g., airport
runways, molecular research, carbon reduction), and
outlined standard ways for political consultants to deal
with them. At policy level, attitudes vary strongly with
distance to one’s back yard. Some groups may defy all
attitude change measures (financial compensation in-
cluded) until some policy is “put on the ground,” upon
which attitudes seem to change.
Presenting joint work in epistemic game theory,
Eric Pacuit (Tilburg) and Olivier Roy (Munich) offered
choice rules—e.g., avoid dominated strategies—as a
normative source for action. They outlined conditions
under which the rules fail to affect players receiving
“differentially good” new information, including strate-
gic information. For instance, weakly dominated strate-
gies may not simply count as “deleted” upon assuming
it to be common knowledge that only admissible strate-
gies are played.
Tim Kenyon (Waterloo) discussed empirical stud-
ies of groups that reach a state of false polarization.
Here, because of biases, subgroups tend to overestimate
their comparative distance apart, unless group members
are instructed to consider the strengths and weaknesses
of the other position (aka. ‘counterfactual metacogni-
tion’). This being a promising exception, few (if any)
reliable depolarization strategies are known, fewer yet
remain self-administrable with the right probabilities.
Studies seem to support the claim that—rather than
improve self -discernment—teaching the bias literature
(e.g., to undergraduates) merely increases the number
of bias ascriptions to third parties.
Undercutting rather than tackling polarization, Mark
Colyvan (Sydney) presented a consensus guaranteed-
strategy for deliberating groups. Here, each agent as-
signs a weight to the priorities that govern a deci-
sion (between several goods or actions). Moreover,
they weigh the degree to which they respect each
other’s priority-weightings. In the limit—or so a the-
orem states—, iterated matrix multiplication of updated
priority-weights with respect-weights will terminate in
consensus. Rather desirably, deliberate initial over- or
underbidding is discouraged insofar as it leads to lower
respect-weights.
Presentations remain available at the workshop web-
site. Principal investigators are Vincent F. Hendricks
(Copenhagen) and Erik J. Olsson (Lund). The next
Copenhagen Lund Workshop in Social Epistemology
takes place 9–10 December at Lund University.
Frank Zenker
Department of Philosophy, Lund University
Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelli-
gence, 3–4 October
The programmatic call for the conference said: “The
theory and philosophy of artificial intelligence has
come to a crucial point where the agenda for the forth-
coming years is in the air—this conference will try to
set that agenda and to gather many of the key play-
ers.” Gathering many of the key players it certainly did,
with most of the ‘who is who’ present (1/3 of partic-
ipants came to Greece from outside Europe). We had
52 speakers at the event, after a rigorous double blind
reviewing procedure—see here for the program and ab-
stracts. The conference at the leafy Anatolia campus
in Thessaloniki and balmy autumn weather provided a
pleasant setting with plenty of space for informal inter-
action, which is often the most productive part of con-
ferences.
As for setting the agenda, at the outset of the confer-
ence we had Hubert Dreyfus warning us of the ‘first step
fallacy’ for progress in AI (we have made the first step
successfully and therefore all the next steps are straight
ahead and feasible), while in the last keynote talk Jim
Moor warned of a ‘last step fallacy’ in the area of com-
puter ethics (we do not know whether we will ever have
the last step of fully responsible artificial agents, there-
fore we should not make the first step towards robotic
ethics). Perhaps one could use these points to charac-
terize the agenda in the field: one camp says that cer-
tain mental properties are necessary for intelligence and
then discuss how and if these can be achieved in ar-
tificial systems, while another camp asks how we can
get ahead towards more intelligent behavior without di-
rectly aiming for systems that have ‘mental properties’.
For the first camp, AI and Cognitive Science are just
two sides of the same coin, for the second, the two are
only loosely connected.
Much of the discussion at our meeting was in the
192
Müller, Vincent C. (2011), ‘Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence, 3–4 October (Report 
on PT-AI 2011)’, The Reasoner, 5 (11), 192-93.
http://www.sophia.de
http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4144-4957
first (CogSci) camp, especially on what should come
after the demise of cognition as computational sym-
bol manipulation. Aspects of non-classical Cognitive
Science proposed included embodiment and morphol-
ogy (Pfeifer, Gomila, Ziemke), (inter-)active cognition
(Bickhard, O’Regan), dynamic systems (Dreyfus) or a
new understanding of consciousness (O’Regan, Chris-
ley) and of meaning (Bishop, Bringsjord). (Of course,
I mention only a few names—in any case, organizers
see little of their own conferences.) Within that first
camp, there was also a considerable current of ‘classi-
cal CogSci’ approaches through computational symbol
manipulation or of attempts to combine both in a ‘dual-
theory’ (e.g., Bringsjord, Bach, Gomila, Milkowski).
As for the second camp of ‘nonCogSci-AI’, this can
be seen in Pfeifer’s (Brooks’ style) embodiment, Slo-
man’s ‘virtual machines’, Scheutz’ emphasis on capa-
bilities or in Bostrom’s discussion of the consequences
of upcoming machine superintelligence—and of course
this camp is dominant in technical AI meetings. Fi-
nally, there are fundamental issues on the theory of
computation that are central for many (C. Smith, Sha-
grir, Bokulich and others) and there is a move towards
respectability for a discussion of ‘singularity’ (Dreyfus,
Bostrom, Sandberg, Yampolskiy etc.). The urgency to
discuss the ethics and societal relevance of AI is gaining
ground—whether or not AI is ultimately ‘possible’.
Overall, the theory and philosophy of AI has set it-
self free from the single focus on the criticism of com-
putational symbol manipulation; it has moved towards a
new Cognitive Science and, in some quarters, a less inti-
mate link with Cognitive Science overall. These devel-
opments support a more constructive cooperation with
those who do ‘the real work’—but also face the real ba-
sic problems.
The conference took place at Anatolia College/ACT
(Thessaloniki) and was sponsored by EUCogII, Oxford-
FutureTech, AAAI, ACM-SIGART, IACAP, ECCAI.
The invited papers of PT-AI 2011 will be published in
two special volumes of the journal Minds and Machines
2012 and the section papers as a book with Springer
Publishers in the new ‘SAPERE’ series in 2012. We
have asked the participants for feedback on the event—
and if that is positive (which seems likely) we will have
more meetings on the “Philosophy and Theory of AI”
in the future. You are welcome!
For more information see here.
Vincent C. Müller
Anatolia College/ACT &
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford
Evolving Knowledge in Theory and Appli-
cations, 4 October
In recent years, intelligent agents in the contexts of open
environments and multi-agent systems have become a
leading paradigm in AI. Acting successfully in such en-
vironments that are uncertain, only partially accessible,
and dynamic, requires sophisticated knowledge repre-
sentation and reasoning techniques for the modelling of
the epistemic state of the agent. In particular, in evolv-
ing environments, the agent must continuously react to
new observations and to any unforeseen changes that
occur. Her epistemic state must undergo corresponding
changes to provide the agent with a suitable world view
at any time. Thus, modern knowledge representation
methods have to deal with the evolution of knowledge
and belief, due to uncertain or incomplete information,
or to changes in the environment.
The workshop Evolving Knowledge in Theory and
Applications was held on October 4, 2011, in Berlin,
Germany, co-located with the 34th Annual German
Conference on AI (KI-2011). It was the 3rd Workshop
on “Dynamics of Knowledge and Belief” (DKB-2011)
organized by the Special Interest Group on Knowl-
edge Representation and Reasoning of the Gesellschaft
für Informatik (GI-Fachgrupppe Wissensrepräsentation
und Schließen).
The particular focus of the workshop was on any
topics of knowledge representation and reasoning that
address the epistemic modelling of agents in open en-
vironments, and in particular on processes concerning
evolving knowledge and belief, both in theory and in
applications. The workshop started with a session on
modelling and reasoning in probabilistic approaches.
In his talk On Prototypical Indifference and Lifted In-
ference in Relational Probabilistic Conditional Logic,
Matthias Thimm investigated the complexity of prob-
abilistic reasoning in a relational setting. Based on the
notion of prototypical indifference he showed that lifted
inference is no longer exponential in the number of do-
main elements when all predicates are unary, but is still
infeasible for the general case.
Markov logic is a formalism generalising both first-
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